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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the doctrine in these cases is that the engineer does not have oppor-
tunity to stop in time to prevent the collision after the plaintiff comes
from behind obstructions onto the track in front of the train.46
The present strict application of the rule that a traveler must, if
possible, get a clear view of a railroad track which he is crossing may
be a part of an increasing trend by the North Carolina Court to decide
contributory negligence cases as questions of law.47 At any rate, the
acceptance of this rule is now settled. The conflicting cases on its appli-
cation can probably be explained by the presence of modifying factors,
rather than by reason of any doubt as to its acceptance.
DiciKso McLEAN, JR.
Negotiable Instruments-Discharge of Prior Party by Statute
of Limitations--Effect on Guarantor and Surety
If the statute of limitations has run in favor of the maker of a
negotiable instrument, is a guarantor or surety on the instrument dis-
charged under Negotiable Instruments Law §120(3),1 which provides
that "A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged by the
discharge of a prior party ?" This question gives rise to two funda-
mental problems: first, is a surety or guarantor secondarily liable under
the Negotiable Instruments Law; second, does §120(3) include a dis-
charge of a prior party by the statute of limitations?
Negotiable Instruments Law §1922 stipulates that "The person pri-
marily liable on an instrument is the person who by the terms of the
instrument is absolutely required to pay the same. All other parties are
secondarily liable." Obviously, under this section, the liability of a
guarantor of collection is secondary, as it is dependent upon the creditor
pursuing the principal debtor with due diligence. Whether the liability
of a guarantor of payment is primary or secondary, however, is subject
to some dispute. One court has held that a guarantor of payment is
primarily liable, but only after the maturity of the note, since after
," The rule of "last clear chance" is applied in some cases in which the plaintiff
is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, as where he goes to sleep
on the tracks. Note, 16 N. C. L. Rav. 50 (1938). In Miller v. Southern Ry.,
205 N. C. 17, 169 S. E. 711 (1933), where the view was obstructed, the court said
the doctrine would not be applied because there was no evidence that the engineer
could have stopped after he discovered the driver was in a position of peril, and
this seems the better justification for refusing the application of the rule in this
situation.
," This trend may be reflected in the "insulation" of the railroad's negligence
by the driver's negligence depriving a passenger of his right to recover, and find-
ing contributory negligence as a matter of law where an automobile driver "out-
runs his headlights." Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 153 (1948).
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §25-127(3) (1943).2N. C. GEN. STAT. §25-2 (1943).
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maturity he is absolutely liable for the payment of the debt. 3 Appar-
ently, this result is reached by construing §192 to mean that any person
who is immediately obligated to pay the instrument is a primary party.
Thus, where a party's obligation is not dependent upon demand, pre-
sentment, and notice nor upon the creditor first suing the principal, his
liability has been said to be primary. 4  Conversely, other courts treat
the guarantor of payment as secondarily liable, even though he waives
demand, presentment, and notice.5 The reasoning used to reach this
result is that the liability of a guarantor is not predicated upon the
terms of the instrument, but upon the contract of guaranty, which is
treated as a separate and distinct contract.
Practically all courts which have passed on the matter have held the
surety to be primarily liable regardless of whether or not he indicates
his suretyship on the face of the instrument." In so holding, it is often
stated that the surety is bound by the terms of the instrument, and that
his liability is coextensive with that of the maker. This result seems
justified when the suretyship is not indicated on the face of the instru-
ment, for then the surety appears to be a person who by the terms of the
instrument is absolutely required to pay. However, when the suretyship
is indicated on the face of the instrument, it seems that a different
result should be reached. When the surety expresses his suretyship on
the face of the instrument, he qualifies his liability; and although the
creditor may immediately proceed against the surety, the relationship
between the two is significantly changed by this express manifestation.
Under the old doctrine of Pain v. Packard,7 for example, the surety
may give the creditor notice to sue the maker; and if suit is not
brought within a reasonable time, the surety is discharged to the extent
of his prejudice. This doctrine has been adopted by statute in many
states with some variations.8 Even in those states where no such rule
'Frost v. Harbert, 20 Idaho 336, 118 Pac. 1095 (1911) ; cf. Beebe v. Kirk-
patrick, 321 Il. 612, 152 N. E. 539 (1926) ; In re Menzer's Estate, 189 Wis. 340,
20 N. W. 703 (1926).
'Night & Day Bank v. Rosenbaum, 191 Mo. App. 559, 177 S. W. 393 (1915)
(accommodation indorser who waived demand, protest, and notice held primarily
liable).
'First Nat'l Bank of Shenandoah v. Drake, 185 Iowa 879, 171 N. W. 115
(1919) ; Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 86 N. H. 144, 164 Atl. 773 (1933)
Northern State Bank v. Bellamy, 19 N. D. 509, 125 N. W. 888 (1910).
'Hardesty v. Young, 34 F. 2d 310 (D. Minn. 1929) (suretyship indicated on
face of instrument); Vanderford v. Farmers & Mechanics Nat'l Bank, 105 Md.
164, 66 Atl. 47 (1907) (suretyship not indicated) ; Rouse v. Wooten, 140 N. C. 557,
53 S. E. 430 (1906) (not clear whether, suretyship indicated on face of instru-
ment); Cellars v. Meachem, 49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426 (1907) (suretyship indi-
cated on face of instrument).
'13 Johns. 174 (N. Y. 1816).
8 Aiz. CODE ANN. §27-1701 (1939); Ky. REv. STAT. §412.110 (1948); Miss.
CoDE ANN. §253 (1942) ; Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §3318 (1939) ; N. C. GEN. STAT.
§26-7 (1943).
[Vol. 29
NOTES AND COMMENTS
obtains, the surety, under certain circumstances, may bring an action
in equity to compel the creditor to proceed against the debtor before
resorting to the surety.9 Also, where property of both the principal
and the surety has been hypothecated, the surety can insist that the
principal's property be resorted to before that of the surety,1 ° and if
the surety and principal are sued jointly, then on execution the property
of the maker is to be exhausted before resorting to that of the surety.11
To say that the surety who indicates his suretyship on the face of the
instrument is by the terms of the instrument absolutely required to pay
the same ignores these qualifications of the absolute obligation to pay
which the existence of a suretyship carries with it. When the surety-
ship is indicated on the face of the instrument it seems a more logical
and equitable result would be reached by holding that the obligation to
pay has been expressly qualified. As stated by one court,' 2 "When a
party on signing clearly indicates upon the instrument the capacity in
which he is willing to be bound, the holder in accepting it cannot mis-
apprehend its true quality, for he then knows that the party may be
held in that capacity and no other." If the surety is not treated as a
secondary party, it seems he will be deprived of many of his common
law defenses. 13
'Bingham v. Mears, 4 N. D. 437, 61 N. W. 808 (1894). In Davis v. Patrick,
57 Fed. 909 (8th Cir. 1893) it is stated that where the surety is likely to sustain
loss by the delay and forbearance of the creditor, or where the creditor has access
to a fund for the payment of his debt which the sureties cannot make available,
a court of equity, at the instance of the surety, will coerce the creditor to pro-
ceed with the collection of his claim against the principal debtor.
10 Weil v. Thomas, 114 N. C. 197, 19 S. E. 103 (1894).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §26-2 (1943).
12 Northern State Bank v. Bellamy, 19 N. D. 509, 125 N. W. 888, 890 (1910).
The UNrFoRm COmiiERCIAL CODE §3-606(1) (Proposed Final Draft, Text and
Comments Ed., 1950), suggested by its drafters as a replacement of NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW §120, provides in part that "The holder discharges any party
to the instrument to the extent that without such party's consent the holder (a)
without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue any person
against whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of recourse
on the instrument, or agrees to suspend the right to enforce against such person
the instrument or collateral." In Comment 1 it is said "The words 'any party
to the instrument' remove an uncertainty arising under the original section. The
suretyship defenses here provided are not limited to parties who are 'secondarily
liable,' but are available to any party who is in the position of a surety, includ-
ing an accommodation maker or acceptor." And in Comment 4 it is stated "The
words 'to the knowledge of the holder' exclude the latent surety, as for example
the accommodation maker where there is nothing on the instrument to show that
he has signed for accommodation and the holder is ignorant of that fact. In such
a case the holder is entitled to proceed according to what is shown by the face
of the paper or what he otherwise knows, and does not discharge the surety when
he acts in ignorance of the relation."
" Negotiable Instruments Law §120 includes several defenses which were
available to the surety at the law merchant. Since §120 applies only to secondary
parties, it would seem that these, defenses would no longer be available to a
surety where he is treated as a primary party. However, in Prudential Insurance
Co. of America v. Bass, 357 Ill. 72, 191 N. E. 284 (1934) the court avoided this
1951]
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Even if the guarantor or surety be considered secondary parties, it
is still necessary to determine whether a discharge of a prior party by
the statute of limitations is sufficient to discharge secondary parties
under §120(3). 14 Before the Negotiable Instruments Law there was
some conflict as to what constituted such a discharge of a prior party
as would discharge a surety or guarantor. One view was that only a
discharge created by some affirmative act of the creditor was sufficient
to discharge secondary parties. 15 In contrast to this was the view that
a discharge initiated by some affirmative act or neglect of the holder was
sufficient.16
This conflict has not been settled by the Negotiable Instruments
Law. Professor Brewster, in his interpretation of §120(3), indicated
that it contemplates a discharge by the holder and not a discharge by
operation of law.' 7 On the other hand, Dean Ames contended' 8 ".... that
if the maker is discharged by the statute of limitations, all the indorsers
are ipso facto discharged." Most of the courts have adopted Professor
Brewster's view.19 Yet, there is at least one decision holding that a
guarantor of payment is discharged by the discharge of the maker by
the statute of limitations.2 0  Strong arguments can be advanced for the
result reached in the above case. Generally, the guarantor is permitted
to set up any defense which the maker of the note has against the holder,
and there is no reason why the statute of limitations should be an ex-
ception to this rule.21 The discharge of the debtor by the statute of
limitations, though not caused by some affirmative act of the holder, is
result by holding that the Negotiable Instruments Law did not apply to sureties
or guarantors and therefore the law merchant was resorted to in order to deter-
mine the rights of such parties. See, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW §196.
" Generally, the statute of limitations will discharge both the surety and the
maker at the same time; however, where the surety has been out of state long
enough to toll the statute as to him, this question is likely to arise. See, N. C.
GEN. STAT. §1-21 (1943).
" Nelson v. First Nat'l Bank, 69 Fed. 798 (8th Cir. 1895) ; Eickhoff v. Eiken-
bary, 52 Neb. 332, 72 N. W. 308 (1897); cf. Bull v. Coe, 77 Cal. 54, 18 Pac. 808
(1888).
( 8 Auchampaugh v. Schmidt, 70 Iowa 642, 27 N. W. 805 (1886); Shutts v.
Fingar, 100 N. Y. 539, 3 N. E. 588 (1885).
"' Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 YALE L. J. 84,
94 (1901).
"
8 Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HAIv. L. REv. 241, 253 (1900).
"9 Finance Corp. of New England v. Parker, 251 Mass. 372, 146 N. E. 696
(1925) (discharge of a prior indorser by statute of limitations did not discharge
subsequent indorsers) ; Romero v. Hopewell, 28 N. M. 259, 210 Pac. 231 (1922)
(discharge of a prior party by the statute of limitations did not discharge secondary
parties).
" First Nat'l Bank of Shenandoah v. Drake, 185 Iowa 879, 171 N. W. 115
(1919).
"1First Nat'l Bank of Shenandoah v. Drake, 185 Iowa 879, 171 N. W. 115
(1919); Auchampaugh v. Schmidt, 70 Iowa 642, 27 N. W. 805 (1886); Skoggs
v. Marcum, 247 Ky. 712, 57 S. W. 2d 670 (1933).
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due directly to the laches of the holder. 22 If the secondary party is
not discharged, the statute of limitations is circumvented; for the holder,
by collecting from the guarantor or surety, permits the surety or
guarantor to pursue the debtor.23  If the surety or guarantor is per-
mitted to take advantage of the debtor's defense, the diligent creditor
can still protect himself against the discharge of the surety or guarantor
due to the running of the statute -gainst the debtor, by obtaining a judg-
ment against the debtor prior to the running of the statute.
No definitive answer to all the questions raised herein is discernible
from the few North Carolina cases available. The court has held that
the liability of a guarantor of collection is conditional. 24 Thus it seems
that he will be considered a secondary party under the Negotiable
Instruments Law. Also, it has been held that a guaranty of payment
is an absolute promise to pay the debt.2 5  But this does not necessitate
the holding that a guarantor of payment is primarily liable, since it has
been stated by the court that a contract of guaranty is separate and
distinct from that of the debtor and that a guarantor's liability is not
the same as that of a surety.2 6 Further, it has been held that a surety
is primarily liable notwithstanding the fact that the suretyship was
expressed on the face of the instrument.2 7 There appear to be no North
Carolina cases indicating what kind of discharge is intended within the
meaning of §120(3).28
THOMAS M. MOORE.
2In Shutts v. Fingar, 100 N. Y. 539, 3 N. E. 588, 590 (1885) the court
remarks, "Where such consequences are produced by the direct action of the
creditor all authorities concur in holding that it constitutes a good defense to the
indorser, and it is difficult to see why the same consequences produced by the
deliberate laches and inaction of the creditor should not lead to the same result."
23 As a general rule the statute of limitations does not begin to run against the
surety until the time of payment by the surety, since the cause of action is not
upon the note itself but upon the implied promise of reimbursement arising from
the payment of the note. Blanchard v. Blanchard, 201 N. Y. 134, 94 N. E. 630
(1911) ; Bishoff v. Fehl, 345 Pa. 539, 29 AtI. 2d 58 (1942) ; Holland v. Tjosevig,
109 Wash. 142, 186 Pac. 317 (1919).
" Sykes v. Everett, 167 N. C. 600, 83 S. E. 585 (1914); Jones v. Ashford, 79
N. C. 172 (1878).
"Cowan v. Roberts, 134 N. C. 415, 46 S. E. 979 (1904) ; see Chemical Co. v.
Griffin, 202 N. C. 812, 813, 164 S. E. 577 (1932).
26 Coleman v. Fuller, 105 N. C. 328, 11 S. E. 175 (1890).
"
7Dry v. Reynolds, 205 N. C. 571, 172 S. E. 351 (1934). In Raleigh Banking
& Trust Co. v. York, 199 N. C. 624, 155 S. E. 263 (1930) and Horton v. Wilson,
175 N. C. 533, 95 S. E. 904 (1918) the surety was held primarily liable but the
suretyship was not expressed on the instrument. In Rouse v. Wooten, 140 N. C.
557, 53 S. E. 430 (1906) it is not clear whether or not the suretyship was ex-
pressed on the instrument. But see Roberson v. Spain, 173 N. C. 23, 25, 91 S. E.
361, 362 (1917) where the court remarks, "On the face of the notes the defendant
Bullock was primarily liable, and an extension of time to Spain would not release
him, in the absence of proof that he was a surety.
"See Carter v. Jones, 40 N. C. 196, 199 (1848) where the court recites the
proposition that mere delay by the creditor will not discharge the surety.
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